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High Speed Rail Transport Valuation 
 
The present paper investigates the optimal timing of investment for a high 
speed rail (HSR) project, in an uncertain environment, using a real options 
analysis (ROA) framework. It develops a continuous time framework with 
stochastic demand that allows for the determination of the optimal timing of 
investment and the value of the option to defer in the overall valuation of the 
project. The modelling approach used is based on the differential utility provided 
to railway users by the HSR service. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The present paper investigates the optimal timing of investment for a high speed rail 
(HSR) project, in an uncertain environment, using a real options analysis (ROA) 
framework. It develops a continuous time framework with stochastic demand that 
allows for the determination of the optimal timing of investment and the value of the 
option to defer in the overall valuation of the project. The modelling approach used is 
based on the differential utility provided to railway users by the HSR service.  
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1. Introduction 
In uncertainty environments flexibility is crucial to perform efficiently, for instance, 
in terms of technological changes, competition’s shifts, or even in order to limit 
potential losses related to unexpected adverse scenarios in the market (Trigeorgis, 
1996).   
In spite of having emerged in the academy, (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; 
McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit, 1989; Pindyck, 1991; and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, 
amongst others), the real options analysis has already made an impact in the business 
world, since an increasing number of companies and managers are adopting a real 
options perspective. Especially in capital budgeting decisions and in the assessment of 
the corresponding strategic positioning and competitiveness (Paddock, Siegel and Smit, 
1988; Nichols, 1994; Kallberg and Laurin, 1997; Moel and Tufano, 2002; Smit, 2003; 
etc.).  
The modelling framework proposed in this paper is inspired by a set of projects for 
the development of high speed rail (HSR) lines in Europe. The structuring nature of the 
projects for the countries involved; the need to renew the railway sector; the huge 
amounts of money needed; the uncertainty about the timings to invest and the economic 
challenge inherent in developing a conceptual setting for a decision that needs to be 
taken in the interest of the entire set of European taxpayers, all play a part in providing 
relevance to the study of the embedded option to defer and the optimal timing to invest. 
In section 2 we present the literature regarding real options in major projects in the 
transportation sector. The valuation framework is developed in section 3. After 
providing numerical results in section 4, section 5 concludes the paper.     
 
2. Real Options in Major Projects in the Transportation Sector  
Although usually linked to political discussion and controversy, transport 
infrastructures tend to be understood as critical for the sustainable growth and 
development of any economy. According to Wilson (1986), since 1870 economists have 
been drawing their attention towards the transport industry in general, and to the railway 
sector in particular. The same author suggests that wrong transportation policies and the 
corresponding investment mistakes in transport infrastructures may compromise 
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seriously economic growth. To prevent this type of outcome, it is important to develop 
and apply suitable decision criteria based upon sound cost/benefit analysis.     
Infrastructure investments that are usually understood to provide benefit and 
leverage to the economic growth of whole regions include investments in seaports, 
airports and railways links, energy networks, road systems, amongst others.  
The size, budget and impact in the global economic activity lead big transportation 
investments to assume the role of strategic options. Almost all these investments include 
a portfolio of options intended to, at some extent, protect the enormous funds needed to 
implement the project from failure.    
Rose (1998) has valued the concession of a toll road, considering the existence of 
two options interacting with each other. The author assumed that the traffic volume 
followed a geometric Brownian motion and used Monte Carlo simulation to compute i) 
the value of the embedded call option that allowed for the early acquisition of the 
project by the franchiser and ii) the option to defer regarding the payment of the 
corresponding fees’ by the franchisee. Similarly, Brandão (2002) applied the Copeland 
and Antikarov’s (2003) framework to value several options embedded in a project that 
included the building and operation of highways in Brazil.  
More recently, two other empirical ROA works focused on the valuation of 
structural investments in the transportation sector, were published: Smit (2003) and 
Bowe and Lee (2004). The first, analyses the expansion of an airport, while the second 
is apparently pioneer in the analysis of a railway transportation project.  
Investments in infrastructure or platform assets generate other investments 
opportunities that change the competitive standing of the companies involved. Smit 
(2003) combines ROA and game theory, in a discrete time framework, to capture the 
intrinsic value derived from the company’s positioning adjustment inside the industry, 
with an empirical application to the expansion of a European airport. His work has 
helped to fill in a gap in the real options literature, where researchers have tended to, 
either, ignore competition, underestimating the impact of a competitive entry, or assume 
that the competition is exogenous to the valuation process.  
Similarly to Smit (2003), Bowe and Lee (2004) apply binomial analysis. However, 
they use a logarithmic transformation similar to Trigeorgis (1991), to evaluate the high 
speed train project in Taiwan, comparing the obtained results with a valuation based on 
traditional capital budgeting decision techniques. The work embraces the valuation of 
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three different options (expand, reduce and defer) and the according interactions, 
included in a project that does not pay dividends. 
Compared to the literature reviewed, our paper introduces in transport valuation 
field the HSR investment analysis in continuous time, providing some closed form 
solutions. Although Pereira et al. (2006) present some research on these issues, their 
work focus in an airport construction project and includes other uncertainty factors.    
 
3. Investment Valuation Using a Real Options Framework  
In a HSR project, at any moment in time, the owner of the investment’s rights holds 
the possibility of acquiring the future cash flow generated by the venture, in exchange 
for the payment of the corresponding implementation costs. Thus, we are dealing with 
an option to invest. 
Considering the investment in a HSR line as an optimal stopping problem allows us 
to determine the value of the embedded option to defer. Following, the work of 
McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Salahaldin and Granger (2005), it also permits to 
determine the optimal timing to invest. 
In the present paper it will be assumed not only that the option to defer is perpetual 
in nature ( ∞=T ), but also that, once implemented, the investment will produce 
perpetual benefits. Without major technological changes, the impact of these 
assumptions in the global valuation should not be unreasonable for two reasons. In the 
first place, because the present value of the more remote cash flows tends naturally to 
zero. In the second place, because maintenance and conservation - whose expenses are 
taken into consideration - tend to restore the operational aptitude of the assets in place 
and the corresponding flow of benefits. 
 
3.1. Optimal Timing to Invest – Investment in one Period 
In a context of the nature above mentioned, a decision to implement a project in a 
non-optimal moment, implies destruction of value. Therefore, finding the optimal 
timing offers the possibility to study the impact of the ability to delay in the global 
value of the project.    
Thus, it is important to answer the question of when to invest, or at least find a 
critical value that might support in a rational way the decision of implementing the 
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investment. The irreversibility features of the investment, given that there is no other 
use for the project rather than the railways, emphasise the importance of estimating the 
optimal timing to invest.   
The model proposed here draws on the work of Salahaldin and Granger (2005) on 
the valuation of sustainable systems of urban transport aimed at relieving air pollution. 
It is a model that comprises a unique change from an inactive to an active state, and 
considers a single stochastic variable.    
Because investment in infrastructures, like HSR lines, will affect the economic and 
social conditions of future generations, it should be assessed considering a global point 
of view, in terms of economic welfare. In an uncertain environment, it will only make 
sense to invest in such a project, if the economic value of the utility provided by the 
resulting benefits is able to surpass the joint value of the option to defer (lost by 
investing) and of the utility provided by the conventional railway system to its users.  
Investing, in a moment other than the corresponding optimal timing, implies a 
reduction in the global level of utility achieved by the users, compromising seriously the 
projects’ success. In such circumstances, any potential user may always maintain his 
current level of utility, choosing to travel in the conventional railway line, rather than in 
the new HSR service. If a suboptimal investment timing is chosen, the ability of the 
HSR service to attract clients will be strongly distressed.     
At any moment users can choose to travel in the conventional railway, without any 
constraints. Consequently, to maintain the users’ utility, the fraction of the new 
investment supported by each one must be identical to the sum of the benefits earned 
resulting from the reduction of the travel time and the conventional service fare saved, 
net of variable and fixed operational costs upheld.     
Given a fixed amount to invest, the higher the demand, the higher the expected net 
benefit per capita. Consequently, higher levels of demand tend to lead to the 
anticipation of the optimal invest timings. The main source of uncertainty derives 
obviously from the level of future demand for the HSR service.  
We will consider that the demand for the new high speed service, tx , follows a 
geometric Brownian motion process:   
ttxtxt dwxdtxdx σµ +=  (1) 
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Similar assumptions may be found in Rose (1998), with the purpose of modelling  
highway traffic; in Salahaldin and Granger (2005), with the purpose of modelling the 
dynamics of a city’ population; and in Marathe and Ryan (2005) and Pereira et al. 
(2006) with the purpose of modelling airline demand. 
In equation (1) xµ  and xσ  represent the growth rate and the standard deviation of 
the demand for the HSR service. We assume that both parameters are constant in time. 
The Wiener process, tw , has zero mean and standard deviation dtxσ . 
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that, in the future, the natural 
demand for HSR will reach a level capable of providing a rational reason to invest in 
such a project.   
In order to model such a situation we are going to assume that each user will face a 
cost for railway travel between two cities, ψ , whose global worth will be a function of 
the value of time for the user, η , and the travel fare, p . According to the literature, 
both these variables exhibit a relationship to the global demand for railway services 
(vide Owen and Phillips, 1987; Wardman, 1994; and Wardman 1997).  
Considering the relationship between the value of travel time and the demand for 
faster railway services (Owen and Phillips, 1987; and Wardman, 1994), the following 
functional form will be used: 
( ) βδβη tt xx =  (2) 
 In this functional form, βδ  represents the elasticity between the value of travel time 
η  and the HSR demand x .  Consequently, β  is the scale parameter between demand, 
x , and the value of travel time, η . 
Concerning the relationship between the fare value and the demand for railway 
services, this will be given by the functional form (Owen and Phillips, 1987): 
( ) αδα tt xxp =  (3) 
The elasticity between the fare value, p , and the HSR demand, x , is represented by 
the parameter αδ . The scale parameter α  relates demand x  and the fare value p . 
The demand may be inferred from the preferences of a risk neutral representative 
user, with a utility function ( ) ccU = . This utility is assumed to be a function of solely 
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the mean consumption per user, in which c  represents the mean consumption of all 
users that constitute the overall demand. The budget constraint is given by:  
( )ttt xcm ψ−=  (4) 
in which ψ  represents the travel cost and m  the individual disposable income by 
unit of time. 
Replacing the level of consumption in the utility function, will allow for the 
determination of the following utility function, V , representative of the value that each 
user attributes to a railway trip:  
( ) ( ) ( )tttt xmcUxV ψ−==  (5) 
The relationship between demand tx  and value of travel time, i) in the period of 
time that precedes investment, 0η ; ii) during the period of effective investment, 1η ; and 
iii) after the investment’s implementation, 2η , is represented, respectively, by 0β , 1β  
and 2β . Since the new rail service will save travel time and, in consequence, will 
reduce the value of travel time from 0η  to 2η , it will be reasonable to expect that from 
the pre-investment period to the operational phase 0β  will change to 2β  with 20 ββ > . 
The difference between 0β  and 2β  reflects the decrease in travel time.   
Meanwhile, for the moment, we will assume that the investment will take place 
during a single period of time. Thus, the relationship between demand and travel costs, 
during the construction period 1β  is assumed to be equal to 2β . 
Analytically, the cost of travelling in a conventional railway, 0ψ , and the cost of 
travelling in HSR, 2ψ , will be represented by the following equations, 
( ) αβ δδ αβψ ttt xxx 000 +=  (6) 
( ) βδβψ tt xx 22 =  (7) 
For modelling purposes, the conventional railway travel cost, 0ψ , includes both the 
value of the travel time lost and the fare paid. In contrast, the HSR travel cost function 
here considered, 2ψ , is not affected by the value of the corresponding fare, 2p , because 
the current valuation framework assumes implicitly that each user will bear his part of 
the investment expenditure plus the corresponding operating costs per user. In other 
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words, a socially acceptable HSR service fare is already implicitly considered in the 
valuation framework. Consequently, it does not make sense to duplicate it.  
The existing conventional railway service that charges a fare 0p , enables us to 
identify the relationship between HSR demand, tx , and the price of a substitute service 
(Owen and Phillips, 1987; and Wardman, 1997) given by equation (3). 
As long as the investment is not implemented, the utility function will be given by: 
( ) αβ δδ αβ tttt xxmxV 000 −−=  (8) 
After the investment is implemented, users will continue to face a (smaller) cost in 
terms of time spent. However, since the analysis performed here takes into 
consideration all costs and benefits induced by the project (including not only capital 
investment expenditure, but also all fixed and variable operating costs), the new utility 
function will be given by:   
( )
tt
ttt xx
xmxV ργϕωβ βδ −−−−= 22  (9) 
with γ  representing the capital investment expenditure, ρ  the discount rate, ω   the 
variable operating costs and ϕ  the fixed operating costs. Notice that 
tx
ϕ  and 
tx
ργ  
represent the fixed operating costs and the investment expenditure per unit of time, for 
each user that integrates the global demand for the HSR service. We assume implicitly 
that the outcomes of the investment will last for an unlimited time horizon.   
The purpose is to carry out the investment without changing the present utility 
function equilibrium. In order to achieve this outcome, it will be necessary to find the 
critical demand level for ∗x , above which it will be optimal to invest.  
Noting that, in these terms, the whole framework might be understood as an 
intergeneration welfare problem, as previously stated, we may use the objective 
function of Ramsey-Koopmans adopted by Salahaldin and Granger (2005). 
Analytically, we have: 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ + ∫∫ ∞+ −−∗ τ ρτ ρ dtexVxdtexVxE ttttttxx 20 0sup  (10) 
Where,   
 τ = Moment of time in which the optimal value is achieved by the first 
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time; 
 ( )txV0
 
= Utility function per unit of time before investment implementation, 
given by the equation (8); 
 ( )txV2 = Utility function per unit of time after investment implementation, given by the equation (9); and 
 tx = Demand throughout time, given by the equation (1); and 
 
Aggregating the utility of all users that constitute the potential demand before and 
after the investment, and replacing 0V  and 2V  for the corresponding values in (8) and 
(9), we get: 
[ ] [ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−−+−− ∫∫ ∞+ −−∗ τ θρτ θθρ ργϕωβαβ βαβ dtxxxmedtxxxmeE ttttttttttxx 20 00sup  
 (11) 
with ββ δθ += 1  and αα δθ +=1 . 
Decomposing the first element of (11), we obtain 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] ⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−−−−+
+−−−−−
∫
∫∫
∞+ −
∞+ −∞+ −
∗
τ
θρ
τ
θθρθθρ
ργϕωβ
αβαβ
β
αβαβ
dtxxxme
dtxxxmedtxxxme
E
tttt
t
tttt
t
tttt
t
x
x
2
000 00sup  
 (12) 
Simplifying (12), the objective function comes as follow,  
[ ] ( )[ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−+−+−− ∫∫ ∞+ −∞+ −∗ τ θθρθθρ ργϕωαββαβ αβαβ dtxxxedtxxxmeE tttttttttxx 0200 00sup
 (13) 
Since the first component does not depend on τ  and ∗x , the problem may be 
rewritten, in the following terms: 
( )[ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−+−∫ ∞+ −∗ τ θθρ ργϕωαββ αβ dtxxxeE ttttxx 020sup  (14) 
This objective function maximizes the net gain provided by an investment in a HSR 
link, in terms of travel costs for the corresponding users. 
Let, 
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( ) ( )[ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−+−= ∫ ∞+ −∗ τ θθρ ργϕωαββ αβ dtxxxeExv ttttx 020  (15) 
 Applying the strong Markov property as in Oksendal (2003) in RHS, we will get:  
( )[ ]
( )[ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−+−=
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+−
∫
∫
∞+ −
∞+ −
∗
0 020
020
dtxxxeE
dtxxxeE
ttt
t
x
ttt
t
x
ργϕωαββ
ργϕωαββ
αβ
αβ
θθρ
τ
θθρ
 
 (16) 
In view of dominated convergence theorem, we have: 
( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫
∫
∞+ −
∞+ −
−−−+−=
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+−
∗∗∗
∗
0 020
0 020
dtxExExEe
dtxxxeE
txtxtx
t
ttt
t
x
ργϕωαββ
ργϕωαββ
αβ
αβ
θθρ
θθρ
 (17) 
We know that tx  follows a geometric Brownian motion described by (1). Thus,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −+∗=∗ tttx xxexxE 212
1 σθθµθθθ  (18) 
The existence of a future optimal timing to invest requires the need to respect the 
following condition ( ) 01
2
1 2 >−−− xx σθθθµρ . This condition imposes the demand 
growth rate to be lower than discount rate, thus providing a rational economic 
interpretation to the underlying mathematical developments. Simplifying again and 
under this new condition, we have:   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) ( ) ( ) γρϕµρωσθσθθµρ ασθσθθµρ ββ
ργϕωαββ
ααα
θ
βββ
θ
θθρ
ωβ
αβ
−−−−+−−++−−
−=
=−−−+−
∗∗∗
∞+ ∗∗∗−∫
xxxxxxx
txtxtx
t
xxx
dtxExExEe
222
0
222
20
0 020
22
2
22
2  
 (19) 
Rewriting (15) taking into consideration the result (19), we achieve: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) γρϕµρωσθσθθµρ ασθσθθµρ ββ ααα
θ
βββ
θ αβ
−−−−+−−++−−
−=
∗∗∗
∗
xxxxxxx
xxxxv 222
0
222
20
22
2
22
2
 
 (20) 
With,  
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( )
222
20
22
2
xxx
A σθσθθµρ
ββ
βββ +−−
−=  (21) 
222
0
22
2
xxx
B σθσθθµρ
α
ααα +−−
=  (22) 
ρ
ϕ−=C  (23) 
γ−=D  (24) 
and 
x
F µρ
ω
−−=  (25) 
function (15) becomes, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) DCxFxBxAxv ++++= ∗∗∗∗ αβ θθ  (26) 
The value of the project, v , considering the current demand level, is given by the 
supreme of (14) determined through the maximization of the function (26), that satisfies 
the differential equation, 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2
1 22 =−′+′′ xvxvxxvx xx ρµσ , for ∗≠ xx  (27) 
Equation (27) satisfies the following conditions:  
1. Initial condition:  
( ) 00 =v  (28) 
2. Value matching condition: 
( ) DCFxBxxAxv ++++= αβ θθ , with *xx =  (29) 
and, 
3. Smooth-pasting condition 
( ) FBxxAxv ++=′ −− 11 αβ θαθβ θθ , with *xx =  (30) 
Since equation (27) is a Cauchy-Euler second order homogeneous differential 
equation, the solution may be written as, 
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( ) 21 21 rr xaxaxv +=  (31) 
where 1r  and 2r  are the two roots of the quadratic equation: 
0)1(
2
1 2 =−+− ρµσ rrr xx  (32) 
given by, 
2
2
2
22
1
2
2
1
2
1
x
xxxxx
r σ
ρσσµµσ +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
=  (33) 
and 
2
2
2
22
2
2
2
1
2
1
x
xxxxx
r σ
ρσσµµσ +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
=  (34) 
As 22
rxa  tends to the infinity when x  tends to zero, according to the initial 
condition (28) and  ( )xv  needs to be limited when 0→x , 02 =a . Thus, equation (31) 
becomes, 
( ) 11 rxaxv =  (35) 
Using the condition ( ) DCxFxBxAxv ++++= ∗∗∗∗ αβ θθ  that results from the 
substitution of x  by ∗x  in equation (29), we find the coefficient 
11111 1
1
rrrrr xDxCxFxBxAa −∗−∗−∗−∗−∗ ++++= αβ θθ , concluding that the solution of (27) 
is, 
( ) 111111 1 rrrrrr xxDxCxFxBxAxv ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ++++= −∗−∗−∗−∗
−∗ αβ θθ  (36) 
For a given value of x  in 0=t , the value of ∗x  that maximizes ( )xv  is implicitly 
given by the equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 01 111111* 11111 =−−−+−+− −∗−∗−∗−∗− rDxrCxrFxrBxrAx rrrrr αθβθ θθ ωβ  (37) 
The critical value ∗x  can only be found through numerical solution of (37), except if 
two assumptions are made. The first assumption related to equality between the HSR 
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demand/value of travel time elasticity and the HSR demand/conventional service fare 
cross elasticity, conducting to θθθ αβ == . The second assumption comes from the 
possibility of neglecting the operational variable costs, 0=F , considering the 
operational characteristics of the project. Taking these two conditions into account, ∗x  
has the following closed form solution:   
( )
( )( )
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−+
+−
=∗ θ
θ1
1ln
exp rBA
DCr
x  (38) 
The critical value ∗x  represents the level of demand that, when reached, justifies 
(turns optimal) an immediate implementation of the project.  
This solution preserves utility equilibrium between HSR and conventional service 
for railway users, making the optimal solution independent of the original income m  
and the initial level of demand for the HSR service 0x . The fact that the whole 
framework is aimed at achieving a better level of global economic welfare, based on the 
equilibrium between the utility of two similar services, turns this model especially 
adequate to analyse governmental scale investment decisions.    
 
3.2. Optimal Timing to Invest – Investment over Several Periods  
Large projects normally take time to implement. Thus, it is crucial to include this 
feature in the ROA’s model, allowing the time-to-build effect to be incorporated. 
Relaxing the assumption previously made at this level and allowing 21 ββ ≠ , we 
create a transition period that corresponds to the time needed to build the HSR link.  
A new HSR link can only start to operate after all the inherent engineering and 
development work is finished. Consequently, during this building period n , the cost of 
travelling is still given by 0ψ , so 1β  remains equal to 0β  ( 01 ββ = ). When the HSR 
starts to operate, the cost of travelling will change to 2ψ , with 2β  incorporating the 
decrease in travel time. 
The new Ramsey-Koopmans objective function becomes, 
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( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ + ∫∫ ∞+ −+−+− −+−+∗ τ ρρτ ρρ dtexVexdtexVexE tntnntn tntnntxx 20sup  (39) 
Where, now:   
 ( )ntxV +0
 
= Utility function by unit of time before the beginning of the HSR 
operation; 
 ( )ntxV +2 = Utility function by unit of time after the beginning of the HSR operation; 
 n = Time-to-build (construction) of the investment;  
With, 
( ) αβ δδ αβ ntntntnt xxmxV ++++ −−= 000  (40) 
and 
( )
nt
n
nt
ntntnt x
e
x
xmxV
++
+++ −−−−=
ρδ ργϕωβ β22  (41) 
 Considering the global utility of all the users that constitute the demand before and 
after the HSR link starts to operate, and substituting 0V  and 2V  from (40) and (41) into 
(39), we obtain: 
( )[ ]
( )[ ] ⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−−−−+
+−−
∫
∫
∞+ −−
+
−
+++
−
−
−
++++
−
∗
τ
ρρρθρ
τ ρθθρ
ργϕωβ
αβ
β
αβ
dteexexxme
dtexxxme
E
nn
nt
n
ntntnt
t
n
n
ntntntnt
t
x
x
2
00
sup  (42) 
with ββ δθ += 1  and αα δθ += 1 . 
 Applying a simplification identical to that performed in the previous section and 
excluding the component that does not depend on τ  and ∗x , it is possible to obtain the 
following objective function, 
( )[ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−+−∫ ∞+ −−++−+−∗ τ ρρθρθρ ργϕωαββ αβ dteexxexeE nnntntnnttxx 020sup  
 (43) 
This objective function, similar to equation (14), maximizes the net utility gain, 
provided by an investment in a HSR link, in terms of travel costs for the corresponding 
users. In contrast to (14), this new formulation considers that after the decision to 
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implement the project a n  building period will need to take place, before the HSR link 
may start to operate. 
Let now 
( ) ( )[ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−+−= ∫ ∞+ −−++−+−∗ τ ρρθρθρ ργϕωαββ αβ dteexxexeExv nnntntnnttx 020  
 (44) 
Using again the strong Markov property from Oksendal (2003) in RHS, we will get: 
( )[ ]
( )[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−−+−=
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+−
∫
∫
∞+ −−
++
−
+
−
∞+ −−
++
−
+
−
∗
0 020
020
dteexxexeE
dteexxexeE
nn
ntnt
n
nt
t
x
nn
ntnt
n
nt
t
x
ργϕωαββ
ργϕωαββ
ρρθρθρ
τ
ρρθρθρ
αβ
αβ
 
 (45) 
In view of dominated convergence theorem, we have, 
( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫
∫
∞+ −−
+
−
+
−
+
−
∞+ −−
+
−
+
−
+
−
−−−+−=
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+−
∗∗∗
∗
0 020
0 020
dteexEexEexEe
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n
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n
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t
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ρρρθρθρ
ρρρθρθρ
αβ
αβ
 
 (46) 
Knowing that tx  follows a geometric Brownian and that ( )θtx xE ∗  is given by (18), 
then,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ntntx xxexxE +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+∗
+ =∗
21
2
1 σθθµθθθ  (47) 
Simplifying again and under the condition that ( ) 01
2
1 2 >−−− xx σθθθµρ , we have, 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) γρϕµρω
σθσθθµρ
α
σθσθθµρ
ββ
ργϕωββ
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ρσθθθµθ
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ααααββββ
ωβ
−−−−
−+−−++−−
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 (48) 
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Rewriting (44) considering these simplifications, we get: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) γρϕµρω
σθσθθµρ
α
σθσθθµρ
ββ
ρρµ
ααα
ρσθθθµθ
βββ
ρσθθθµθ ααααββββ
−−−−
−+−−++−−
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⎛ −−+∗⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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 (49) 
Now with,  
( ) ( )
222
1
2
1
20
22
2
2
xxx
n
tc
xx
eA σθσθθµρ
ββ
βββ
ρσθθθµ βββ
+−−
−=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+
 (50) 
( )
222
1
2
1
0
22
2
2
xxx
n
tc
xx
eB σθσθθµρ
α
ααα
ρσθθθµ ααα
+−−+=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+
 (51) 
ρ
ϕ ρn
tc
eC
−
−=  (52) 
( )
x
n
tc
xeF µρ
ω ρµ
−−=
−
 (53) 
and D  equal to (24). The subscript tc  used above refers to solutions for A , B , C  
and F  that apply to situations in which a time-to-build effect is considered.   
The supreme of function (43) is determined thought the maximization of a function 
similar to (26), with the inclusion of the above-mentioned difference in terms of 
notation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) DCxFxBxAxv tctctctc ++++= ∗∗∗∗ αβ θθ  (54) 
It is solved in the same way, since it satisfies the same differential equation (27) and 
also boundary conditions (28), (29), and (30).  
For a given value of x  in 0=t , the value of *x  that maximizes ( )xv  is given by the 
numerical solution of the equation:  
( ) ( ) ( ) 01 111111 11111 =−−−+−+− −∗−∗−∗−∗−∗ rDxrxCrxFrxBrxA rrtcrtcrtcrtc αθβθ θθ αβ  
 (55) 
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with 1r  given by (33). 
When θθθ αβ ==  and 0=tcF , *x  is given by the following closed form solution 
similar to (38): 
( )
( )( )
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−+
+−
=∗ θ
θ1
1ln
exp rBA
DCr
x tctc
tc
 (56) 
In this case, the critical value ∗x  represents the level of demand that, when reached, 
justifies (turns optimal), an immediate implementation of a project whose HSR link will 
start to operate  n  periods afterwards. 
Using the traditional capital budgeting analysis, based on the concept of net present 
value (NPV), the rationale for taking the decision would be structurally similar, except 
that the decision would not be taken in an uncertain framework: the capital investment 
should only take place when the reduction in the cost of travelling provided by the HSR 
link and measured by the difference between 0ψ  and 2ψ  was enough to cover for the 
investment capital expenditure plus the operating costs. Analytically, for ωβ θθθ == , 
0=tcF  and any 0≥n , we have, 
n
ntntnt exxx
ρθθθ ργϕβαβ ++>+ +++ 200  (57) 
Considering ntnt exx
θµθθ ≡+ , it would only become optimal to invest if the demand 
level reached, 
( )
θ
θµ
ρ
αββ
ργϕ
1
020
ˆ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
+=> n
n
t e
exx  (58) 
with xˆ  representing the traditional capital budgeting analysis critical demand level, 
that once reached would justify the investment.  
The comparison between the optimal rule of investment given by ROA (38) and by 
traditional capital budgeting analysis becomes evident if in an investment implemented 
in one single period of time, we consider 1=θ  as well as nil fixed and variable costs 
( 0==ωϕ ). 
In this case, equations (56) and (58) would become, 
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( )( )tctc BAr
Drx +−
−=∗
11
1  (59) 
( )020ˆ αββ
ργ
+−=x  (60) 
Equations (59) and (60) show that xx ˆ>∗ . Thus, when ∗<< xxx tˆ  a decision to 
implement based on a traditional capital budgeting analysis framework results in a value 
reduction for the whole project. In this situation, the value of the projects will be smaller 
than the sum of the capital expenditure and the value of the (sacrificed) option to defer. 
The ability to delay has value because it allows for uncertainty resolution.  
 
3.3. Valuation of an HSR Investment Using ROA Framework 
Considering the investment value function given by the (36), for a given level of x , 
with 0=t , the value of an investment opportunity when *xx <  is given by: 
( ) [ ]DCxFxBxA
x
xxv tctctctc
r
++++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∗∗∗ αβ θθ
1
*  (61) 
while for *xx ≥  the value of the investment opportunity is given by: 
( ) 111111 1 rrrtcrtcrtcrtc xxDxCxFxBxAxv ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ++++= −−−−
− αβ θθ  (62) 
Assuming αβ θθθ ==  and 0=tcF , we may replace the critical value, *x , given by 
(56) in the second part of the RHS of equation (61) and simplifying, the solution of the 
project’s value function may be rewritten in the following terms: 
( )
( )
( )
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
≥+++
<⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=
*
*
1
*
1
xxforDCxBA
xxfor
r
DC
x
x
xv
tctctc
tc
r
θ
θ
θ
 (63) 
with tcC , D , 1r , tcA  and tcB  given by (52), (24), (33), (50) and (51). 
In accordance to the literature (vide McDonald and Siegel, 1986; and Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994), from the moment τ , in which the optimal number of passengers is 
reached, *x , the value of the option to defer is zero, since it is always better to 
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implement the investment and receive in exchange the NPV - given by 
DCxFxBxA tctctctc ++++ αβ θθ  - of the expected decrease in the cost of travelling.   
As long as the optimal timing to implement the investment is not reached, τ<t , 
there is always an inherent value of waiting for new information about demand. In this 
case, the value of the option to defer is given by the difference between ( )xv  and the 
NPV calculated using the expected demand at that moment.  
  In addition for allowing the inclusion of the impacts produced by i) the building 
period, ii) the fixed operating costs and iii) the variable operating costs, in the global 
value of the project, these developments take into consideration the elasticity between 
the value of travel time and demand. As the model is developed in terms of differential 
utility, factors other than those cost’ related to travelling (e.g., income), are assumed to 
be constant and do not influence the final outcome.   
Whenever the elasticity between demand and value of travel time is null  
( 10 =⇒= ββ θδ ), we are implicitly assuming that neither the conventional railway 
service nor HSR service will suffer real changes in terms value of travel time. Real 
changes in both services’ fares imply positive levels of elasticity. Similarly, the 
conventional railway service fare remains constant in real terms whenever 
10 =⇒= αα θδ .  
If 1>βθ , increases in the value of travel time will be directly related to the 
passengers’ growth rate.  This type of demand behaviour for a faster rail transportation 
related to the value of travel time, besides being economically rational, is supported by 
the work of Owen and Phillips (1987) and Wardman (1994). In this sense it is 
acceptable that increases in the demand for the HSR service are, at least partially due to 
raises by the users in the value of travel time.  
When 1>αθ , the cross elasticity between conventional railway fare and HSR 
demand is positive. Supported by the works of Owen and Phillips (1987) and Wardman 
(1997), increases in the fare of substitute service justify increases in the railway service 
demand. 
The global value of a project determined by this ROA framework includes the 
economic worth of the ability to wait for uncertainty resolution, provided by the option 
to defer. When the ability to delay does not exist, as in the traditional capital budgeting 
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decision analysis, this component is not taken into consideration and the global result 
will underestimate the corresponding true value. The value embedded in the option to 
postpone the investment derives from the incorporation of the value inherent in the 
“good tail” of the uncertainty regarding the demand by the HSR service. Turning 
parallel, the “bad tail” of demand uncertainty is limited by the option to carry on 
deferring (not investing), if the situation does not look attractive enough (McDonald and 
Siegel, 1986 and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
 
4. Numerical Example  
We are going to assume a project for the construction of a HSR link connecting two 
cities. The basic parameters are in Table 1. The conventional railway service operates in 
the same link. The new HSR service will reduce the travel time to one third 
comparatively to the conventional railway service.  
Table 1. Base-case parameters for the project  
Parameter Value 
x  – HSR demand at actual moment  3 M  
γ  – Present value of the investment expenditures 5,000 M€ 
0η  – Value of travel time in conventional railway service 30 € 
2η  – Value of travel time in HSR service 10 € 
0p  – Conventional railway service fare 25 € 
ω  – Variable operating costs 1 € 
ϕ  – Fixed operating costs 90 M€ 
ρ  – Discount rate 0.09 
xµ  – Expected growth rate of x  0.035 
xσ  – Standard deviation of x  0.20 
n  – Number of years for the construction 5 
βδ  – Elasticity between x  and η  0.60 
αδ  – Cross elasticity between x  and 0p  0.40 
Note:  M = Millions  
 
Table 2 presents the HSR line investment valuation results for the base-case 
parameters. 
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Table 2. Project valuation results   
Output Value 
∗x  – Critical demand for HSR service (n.º passengers) 10.777 M ( )xv  – Investment Opportunity Value 3,743.3 M€ 
npv  – Net Present Value 254.2 M€ 
vod  – Value of the Option do Defer 3,489.1 M€ 
 
Based on the results obtained, the construction of the HSR line should only start 
when the demand reaches 10,777 million passengers. Although the project registers a 
slightly positive NPV, it shouldn’t be implemented at the current time, concerning the 
uncertainty regarding the number of passengers of the new service. Maintaining “alive” 
this investment opportunity has a value of 3,743 million euros, of which 93,21% results 
from the value of the option to defer the investment.  
Figure 1 represents the evolution of the investment’s opportunity value, the NPV 
and the option to defer according to the demand tx  increase throughout time. As we 
may observe, if the demand exceeds 10,777 million passengers, the option to defer the 
implementation no longer has value. Thus, from this point on, the decision to 
immediately implement the project is the one which maximizes the value for its owners.  
Figure 1. Investment’s opportunity value, NPV and value of the option to defer, for 
the base case 
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Figure 2 to Figure 7 show the sensibility of the valuation indicators of the project 
regarding the variation of some parameters.  
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Figure 2.  The impact of the growth rate 
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Figure 3. The impact of the discount rate 
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Figure 4. The impact of the investment expenditures 
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Figure 5. The impact of the volatility of the number of passengers 
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Figure 6. The impact of the time-to-build 
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Thus, we may notice that critical demand level  ∗x  varies inversely with the demand 
growth rate xµ  (Figure 2) and with the reduction of the value of travel time given by 
0
20
η
ηη −  which the HSR line enables (Figure 7). For higher demand growth rates xµ  
and with major reductions in the value of travel time, the present value of the benefits 
resulting from the project increases, justifying anticipating its implementation.     
The other parameters analyzed assume a direct relationship with the critical level of 
demand ∗x . Larger discount rates  (Figure 3), larger investment expenditures (Figure 4), 
larger volatility in the number of passengers (Figure 5) or more construction time 
needed (Figure 6) instigate significant postponements in the projects’ implementation. 
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Figure 7. The impact of the reduction in the value of travel time 
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In presence of variations in any of the analyzed parameters, the investment’s 
opportunity value and the NPV always register the same trend, for each one of the 
parameters, although with different drifts. Figure 5 shows that NPV increases with 
uncertainty increase. This result originates from the fact that the valuation model 
incorporates the elasticity between HSR demand and the value of travel time and the 
cross elasticity between the HSR demand and the conventional service fare. This 
specificity of the developed model results in a value of the option to defer that slightly 
diminishes with the increase of uncertainty. These findings can also be seen in Figure 8. 
It is always assumed that the discount rate remains unchanged as the volatility of the 
project changes.  
If a larger construction period of time is required, the increase in uncertainty 
throughout time and the delay of the benefits from the investment’s operation instigate a 
reduction in the investment’s opportunity value and in the NPV (Figure 6). 
Figure 9 gives the joint impact of both the discount rate ρ  and the investment 
expenditures γ  in the critical demand value ∗x  and in the value of the option to defer. 
Both valuation outputs shows a direct relationship with these two parameters, turning 
the option to defer more valuable as this project parameters value increase. As showed 
in Figure 3 and Figure 4 this is due to a deeper decrease in NPV than the one registered 
in the investment’s opportunity value. 
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Figure 8. The impact of both the volatility of the number of passengers and the discount 
rate 
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Figure 9. The impact of both the investment expenditures and the discount rate 
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5. Conclusion 
 The present work develops a model aimed at finding the optimal timing to 
implement a HSR investment, in an uncertain environment. We have introduced several 
adjustments to the original valuation model of the option to defer (McDonald and 
Siegel, 1986) and to the optimal stopping model of Salahaldin and Granger (2005), 
given the need to design a model applicable to an HSR investment in an environment of 
stochastic demand. As far has we are aware, the development of closed form solution 
ROA’s models to value railway investments was never done before.    
The existence of a conventional railway service enables the analysis of the 
investment in HSR to be performed in an incremental basis, measured in terms of the 
corresponding utility functions. The indifference in the demand utility between HSR 
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and conventional railway services makes possible for the problem to be equated in 
terms of finding a critical demand level that justifies the project implementation. 
The presented developments, regarding the optimal timing to invest and the 
investment’s opportunity value, have the advantage of offering a clear way to evaluate 
the utility of the HSR investment in each moment in time, for the set of potential users - 
the society in general. The numerical example and simulation of some important input 
parameters demonstrates the consistency of the model concerning the behaviour of the 
valuation outputs.   
In future research, it should be possible to enrich the model in order to include more 
uncertainty sources – like the fare price and the investment expenditure. Additionally, 
we expect to perform an empirical application1 capable of providing the feedback useful 
to guide additional improvements in the structure of the modelling framework.  
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